One example payoff structure that results in a Prisoners Dilemma is outlined in Table 7. startxref In the Prisoner's dilemma, defect is a dominant strategy and only the bad outcome is possible. In the long term, environmental regulation in theory protects us all, but even if most of the countries sign the treaty and regulate, some like China and the US will not forsovereigntyreasons, or because they areexperiencinggreat economic gain. The real peril of a hasty withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, though, can best be understood in political, not military, terms. However, in Deadlock, the prospect of both actors defecting is more desirable than both actors cooperating. Sharp's consent theory of power is the most well articulated connection between nonviolent action and power theory, yet it has some serious shortcomings, especially in dealing with systems not fitting a ruler-subject dichotomy, such as capitalism, bureaucracy, and patriarchy. Donna Franks, an accountant for Southern Technologies Corporation, discovers that her supervisor, Elise Silverton, made several errors last year. Uneven distribution of AIs benefits couldexacerbate inequality, resulting in higher concentrations of wealth within and among nations. In game theory, the stag hunt, sometimes referred to as the assurance game, trust dilemma or common interest game, describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. For example, if the two international actors cooperate with one another, we can expect some reduction in individual payoffs if both sides agree to distribute benefits amongst each other. Payoff matrix for simulated Chicken game. Those who play it safe will choose There is a substantial relationship between the stag hunt and the prisoner's dilemma. Human security is an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities whose proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the state. As a result of this, security-seeking actions such as increasing technical capacity (even if this is not explicitly offensive this is particularly relevant to wide-encompassing capacity of AI) can be perceived as threatening and met with exacerbated race dynamics. As a result, there is no conflict between self-interest and mutual benefit, and the dominant strategy of both actors would be to defect. The stag hunt problem originated with philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Discourse on Inequality. This additional benefit is expressed here as P_(b|A) (A)b_A. Due to the potential global harms developing AI can cause, it would be reasonable to assume that government actors would try impose safety measures and regulations on actors developing AI, and perhaps even coordinate on an international scale to ensure that all actors developing AI might cooperate under an AI Coordination Regime[35] that sets, monitors, and enforces standards to maximize safety. Schelling and Halperin[44] offer a broad definition of arms control as all forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it.. The story is briey told by Rousseau, in A Discourse on Inequality: "If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach On the face of it, it seems that the players can then 'agree' to play (c,c); though the agreement is not enforceable, it removes each player's doubt about the other one playing c". This technological shock factor leads actors to increase weapons research and development and maximize their overall arms capacity to guard against uncertainty. [28] Once this Pandoras Box is opened, it will be difficult to close. PDF Mistrust, Misperception, and Misunderstanding: Imperfect Information As we discussed in class, the catch is that the players involved must all work together in order to successfully hunt the stag and reap the rewards once one person leaves the hunt for a hare, the stag hunt fails and those involved in it wind up with nothing. Finally, in a historical survey of international negotiations, Garcia and Herz[48] propose that international actors might take preventative, multilateral action in scenarios under the commonly perceived global dimension of future potential harm (for example the ban on laser weapons or the dedication of Antarctica and outer space solely for peaceful purposes). [47] George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, & Randolph M. Siverson, Arms Races and Cooperation, World Politics, 38(1: 1985): 118146. If an individual hunts a stag, he must have the cooperation of his partner in order to succeed. The corresponding payoff matrix is displayed as Table 14. Table 11. b What is the 'New Barbarism' view of contemporary conflicts? Author James Cambias describes a solution to the game as the basis for an extraterrestrial civilization in his 2014 science fiction book A Darkling Sea. 2 Examples of states include the United States, Germany, China, India, Bolivia, South Africa, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam. [49] For example, by defecting from an arms-reduction treaty to develop more weapons, an actor can gain the upper hand on an opponent who decides to uphold the treaty by covertly continuing or increasing arms production. What is the key claim of the 'Liberal Democratic Peace' thesis? International Relations, An approximation of a Stag Hunt in international relations would be an international treaty such as the Paris Climate Accords, where the protective benefits of environmental regulation from the harms of climate change (in theory) outweigh the benefits of economic gain from defecting. However, a hare is seen by all hunters moving along the path. Intuition and Deliberation in the Stag Hunt Game - Nature Carol M. Rose argues that the stag hunt theory is useful in 'law and humanities' theory. [52] Stefan Persson, Deadlocks in International Negotiation, Cooperation and Conflict 29, 3(1994): 211244. hVN0ii ipv@B\Z7 'Q{6A"@](v`Q(TJ}Px^AYbA`Z&gh'{HoF4 JQb&b`#B$03an8"3V0yFZbwonu#xZ? In short, the theory suggests that the variables that affect the payoff structure of cooperating or defecting from an AI Coordination Regime determine which model of coordination we see arise between the two actors (modeled after normal-form game setups). An individual can get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. A classic game theoretic allegory best demonstrates the various incentives at stake for the United States and Afghan political elites at this moment. On the face of it, the USSR Swerved, but I believe that both sides actually made concessions, although the US made theirs later on, to save face. In this article, we employ a class of symmetric, ordinal 2 2 games including the frequently studied Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag Hunt to model the stability of the social contract in the face of catastrophic changes in social relations. Meanwhile, the harm that each actor can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime consists of both the likelihood that the actor themselves will develop a harmful AI times that harm, as well as the expected harm of their opponent developing a harmful AI. hTIOSQ>M2P22PQFAH Stag Hunts: fascinating and useful game theory model for collective 16 (2019): 1. Still, predicting these values and forecasting probabilities based on information we do have is valuable and should not be ignored solely because it is not perfect information. For example, Stag Hunts are likely to occur when the perceived harm of developing a harmful AI is significantly greater than the perceived benefit that comes from a beneficial AI . Specifically, it is especially important to understand where preferences of vital actors overlap and how game theory considerations might affect these preferences. Uses of Game Theory in International Relations Furthermore, a unilateral strategy could be employed under a Prisoners Dilemma in order to effect cooperation. While there is certainly theoretical value in creating a single model that can account for all factors and answer all questions inherent to the AI Coordination Problem, this is likely not tractable or useful to attempt at least with human hands and minds alone. Evidence from AI Experts (2017: 11-21), retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1705.08807. The area of international relations theory that is most characterized by overt metaphorical imagery is that of game theory.Although the imagery of game theory would suggest that the games were outgrowths of metaphorical thinking, the origins of game theory actually are to be found in the area of mathematics. As such, Chicken scenarios are unlikely to greatly affect AI coordination strategies but are still important to consider as a possibility nonetheless. For the painting about stag hunting, see, In this symmetric case risk dominance occurs if (. What are some good examples of coordination games? I introduce the example of the Stag Hunt Gamea short, effective, and easy-to-use activity that simulates Jean-Jacques Rousseau's political philosophy. [4] Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford University Press, 2014). Name four key thinkers of the theory of non-violent resistance, Gandhi, martin luther king, malcon X, cesar chavex. The United States is in the hunt, too. Read about me, or email me. In order to assess the likelihood of such a Coordination Regimes success, one would have to take into account the two actors expected payoffs from cooperating or defecting from the regime. This means that it remains in U.S. interests to stay in the hunt for now, because, if the game theorists are right, that may actually be the best path to bringing our troops home for good. The remainder of this subsection looks at numerical simulations that result in each of the four models and discusses potential real-world hypotheticals these simulations might reflect. Cultural Identity - crucial fear of social systems. In this section, I outline my theory to better understand the dynamics of the AI Coordination Problem between two opposing international actors. In the current Afghan context, the role of the U.S. military is not that of third-party peacekeeper, required to guarantee the peace in disinterested terms; it has the arguably less burdensome job of sticking around as one of several self-interested hunters, all of whom must stay in the game or risk its collapse. [29] There is a scenario where a private actor might develop AI in secret from the government, but this is unlikely to be the case as government surveillance capabilities improve. Within these levels of analysis, there are different theories that have could be considered. Here, both actors demonstrate varying uncertainty about whether they will develop a beneficial or harmful AI alone, but they both equally perceive the potential benefits of AI to be greater than the potential harms. As a result, this could reduce a rival actors perceived relative benefits gained from developing AI. The ultimate resolution of the war in Afghanistan will involve a complex set of interlocking bargains, and the presence of U.S. forces represents a key political instrument in those negotiations. This is taken to be an important analogy for social cooperation. As a result, it is conceivable that international actors might agree to certain limitations or cooperative regimes to reduce insecurity and stabilize the balance of power. [49] For example, see Glenn H. Snyder Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics, International Studies Quarterly 15, 1(1971): 66103 and Downs et al., Arms Races and Cooperation., [50] Snyder, Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics., [51] Snyder, Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics.. [11] In our everyday lives, we store AI technology as voice assistants in our pockets[12] and as vehicle controllers in our garages. 0000002555 00000 n
Explain how the 'Responsibility to Protect' norm tries to provide a compromise between the UN Charter's principle of non-interference (state sovereignty) and the UN genocide convention. [8] If truly present, a racing dynamic[9] between these two actors is a cause for alarm and should inspire strategies to develop an AI Coordination Regime between these two actors. Additionally, the feedback, discussion, resource recommendations, and inspiring work of friends, colleagues, and mentors in several time zones especially Amy Fan, Carrick Flynn, Will Hunt, Jade Leung, Matthijs Maas, Peter McIntyre, Professor Nuno Monteiro, Gabe Rissman, Thomas Weng, Baobao Zhang, and Remco Zwetsloot were vital to this paper and are profoundly appreciated. publications[34] and host the worlds most prominent tech/AI companies (US: Facebook, Amazon, Google, and Tesla; China: Tencent and Baidu). This essay first appeared in the Acheson Prize 2018 Issue of the Yale Review of International Studies. How does the Just War Tradition position itself in relation to both Realism and Pacifism? 'War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention'. This equilibrium depends on the payoffs, but the risk dominance condition places a bound on the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Based on the values that each actor assigns to their payoff variables, we can expect different coordination models (Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken, Deadlock, or Stag Hunt) to arise. In the context of international relations, this model has been used to describe preferences of actors when deciding to enter an arms treaty or not. It truly takes a village, to whom this paper is dedicated. One example addresses two individuals who must row a boat. PxF`4f$CN*}S -'2Y72Dl0%^JOG?Y,XT@ dF6l]+$.~Qrjj}46.#Z x^iyY2)/c
lLU[q#r)^X If they are discovered, or do not cooperate, the stag will flee, and all will go hungry. Therefore, if it is likely that both actors perceive to be in a state of Prisoners Dilemma when deciding whether to agree on AI, strategic resources should be especially allocated to addressing this vulnerability. How do strategies of non-violent resistance view power differently from conventional 'monolithic' understandings of power? If both choose to row they can successfully move the boat. In international relations, examples of Chicken have included the Cuban Missile Crisis and the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction in nuclear arms development. hRj0pq%[a00a
IIR~>jzNTDLC=Qm=,e-[Vi?kCE"X~5eyE]/2z))!6fqfx6sHD8&: s>)Mg 5>6v9\s7U She argues that states are no longer The familiar Prisoners Dilemma is a model that involves two actors who must decide whether to cooperate in an agreement or not. [21] Jackie Snow, Algorithms are making American inequality worse, MIT Technology Review, January 26, 2018, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610026/algorithms-are-making-american-inequality-worse/; The Boston Consulting Group & Sutton Trust, The State of Social mobility in the UK, July 2017, https://www.suttontrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/BCGSocial-Mobility-report-full-version_WEB_FINAL-1.pdf. David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. Altogether, the considerations discussed are displayed in Table 6 as a payoff matrix. in . In addition to leadership, the formation of a small but successful group is also likely to influence group dynamics. The paper proceeds as follows.